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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of "doing business" was once characterized as a
"general policy adopted by the various states by which they attempt
to exclude all outsiders from engaging in commercial activities in
their boundaries."' Such exclusionary purposes reflected traditional
hostility toward and distrust of foreign corporations. With the
emergence of nationwide corporate activity, however, some states
became interested in finding that corporate activity constituted
"doing business" in order to procure control over those corporations.
In either case, the definition of "doing business" within a particular
state varied depending upon the purpose of the inquiry-the reason
the state sought either exclusion or control of the corporation.'
1. Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 1018, 1018 (1925).
2. J. HEERSTEmiN & W. HELERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 307 (4th ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as HELLERSTEIN].
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Three distinct purposes are generally recognized as motivating
inquiry into whether a foreign corporation is "doing business": sub-
jecting the corporation to suit and service of process; imposing ex-
cise taxes upon the corporation for the privilege of doing business
within the state; or subjecting the corporation to regulatory legisla-
tion.' Implicit in these categories is the assumption that "doing
business" for purposes of one category may not constitute "doing
business" for purposes of another. Thus, a corporation may be con-
ducting its affairs within a state to a sufficient degree to constitute
"doing business" for purposes of service of process, yet may not have
sufficient contacts to permit state regulatory control. This anomaly
has resulted in considerable judicial confusion. For example, courts
often have relied on decisions defining "doing business" in one con-
text to justify state assumption of jurisdiction in another because
of the absence of a clearly defined standard in either context.' The
issue whether a corporation is doing business in a particular context
is a factual one to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Although it is clear that different degrees of activity within a
state are required before a corporation will be deemed to be "doing
business" in a particular context, no recent attempt has been made
to define each level of activity or to analyze the reasons for the
distinctions.' This Note will attempt to analyze the present status
of the term "doing business" or the substitute terminology used to
define that level of activity sufficient to subject a foreign corpora-
tion to state control in a particular context.' After defining the
3. Id. In many instances the final category, amenability to regulatory legislation, is
limited to cases in which states seek to license the foreign corporation, or require the corpora-
tion to "qualify" to do business. This restriction, however, excludes a significant number of
situations in which states attempt to subject the foreign corporations to police power regula-
tions, primarily directed at consumer protection. For discussion of these decisions, see notes
89-117 infra and accompanying text.
4. For example, in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 288-92 (1961),
Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, contended that the majority had uncritically blended
three lines of decisions concerning the power of a state to tax an interstate enterprise, to
subject it to local suits, and to license it.
5. Perhaps the most significant study was 'provided in a 1925 article in which the author
concluded:
The business which must be transacted by a foreign corporation to permit service of
process must be such as to warrant the inference that the corporation is present. To
subject such a corporation to taxation for doing business, the transactions must not only
show that the corporation is present but also that it is active. In order that qualification
be rendered necessary, the corporation must not only be present and active, but its
activity must be continuous.
Isaacs, supra note 1, at 1045.
6. In doing so, a historical analysis of the evolution of the concept in each context is
necessary for two reasons. First, since the determination whether certain activities constitute
"doing business" in a particular context depends upon the facts of each case, any attempt to
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degree of activity necessary to permit the state to exercise control
in each context, this Note will analyze the accuracy and utility of
using terminology such as "doing business" in describing whether
corporate activity within a state is sufficient to permit state exercise
of legislative7 or judicial jurisdiction. This Note concludes by pro-
posing that use of such ambiguous language be discontinued in
favor of a single due process "nexus" test to be applied as a thresh-
old requirement for the exercise of any state authority, and that
legislative jurisdiction be further subject to the commerce clause
requirement that legislative demands made with respect to foreign
corporations engaged in interstate commerce must not be excessive
in relation to the benefits and protection conferred by the state.
II. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION: AMENABILITY OF FOREIGN CORPORATONS TO
SERVICE OF PROCESS
The difficulty of defining whether a foreign corporation is
"doing business" within a state to an extent sufficient to subject
that corporation to service of process resulted from the conflict be-
tween the traditional notion that "[t]he foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power" and the conception of corporations as artificial
persons existing only within the territorial confines of the sover-
eignty in which they were incorporated.' While due process stan-
dards for judicial jurisdiction are now governed by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 10 the evolution of judicial perception of the
foreign corporation in this context provides insight into these stan-
dards. The following discussion will outline this evolution" for pur-
poses of later comparative analysis with the due process treatment
of legislative jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
A. Consent and Presence: The Early Decisions
The earliest cases dealing with the amenability of foreign corpo-
rations to service of process prohibited any action for the recovery
delineate a single rule for each category is unrealistic. Second, a simple synopsis of the most
recent decisions in each area fails to provide the background leading to that present sta-
tus-whether the requisite amount of activities is increasing or decreasing-and thus provides
no insight into the future of the concept.
7. Legislative jurisdiction includes jurisdiction to tax corporations, to license them, and
to subject those corporations to other forms of state regulatory authority.
8. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
9. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588, 13 Pet. 443, 505 (1839).
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. An exhaustive study of the area will not be attempted, since it would not serve the
purposes of this Note and would be unjustified in light of the many existing articles concern-
ing in personam jurisdiction in general.
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of a personal demand outside the state in which the corporation was
chartered.12 This exemption from suit in any state other than that
of incorporation, however, resulted in significant inconvenience and
manifest injustice to those injured by the in-state activities of for-
eign corporations." As corporate transactions assumed national pro-
portions, state courts were compelled to find grounds upon which
jurisdiction could be asserted over foreign corporations. Early cases
used a number of different rubrics for what was essentially a purely
quantitative analysis of the extent to which the foreign corporation
was "doing business" in the forum state-an arbitrary approach
that was later condemned."4
One line of cases reasoned that because corporate activity in a
foreign state required express or implied consent's from that state,
such consent could be conditioned on the foreign corporation's ac-
ceptance of service of process in any litigation arising out of corpo-
rate activity in the forum state. 6 These "consent" cases, however,
did not sanction assumption of jurisdiction on this ground in the
absence of a finding that the corporation was "doing business"
within the state. In Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v.
McDonough, " an Indiana insurance company was sued in Pennsyl-
vania for payment on an insurance contract. Although Pennsylvania
law established a presumption that a foreign corporation doing busi-
ness in the state had consented to be sued there, Old Wayne's activi-
ties in Pennsylvania were minimal." The Supreme Court, therefore,
denied jurisdiction to the Pennsylvania courts, stating that consent
to service cannot be implied "where it affirmatively appears, as it
does here, that the business was not transacted" in the state." The
12. See, e.g., Peckham v. North Parish in Haverill, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 274 (1834);
M'Queen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
13. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882).
14. See notes 29-30 infra and accompanying text.
15. A corporation is not a citizen under the privileges and immunities clause, U.S.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1927).
16. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 404 (1855).
17. 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
18. Old Wayne's only business offices were in Indiana; its officers resided there; it had
never been admitted to do business in Pennsylvania nor did it have an office or agency there;
and none of its agents were in Pennsylvania at the date of the suit or anytime thereafter. Id.
at 14.
19. Id. at 22. The Court went on to say:
While the highest considerations of public policy demand that an insurance corporation,
entering a State in defiance of a statute which lawfully prescribes the terms upon which
it may exert its powers there, should be held to have assented to such terms as to
business there transacted by it, it would be going very far to imply, and we do not imply,
such assent as to business transacted in another State, although citizens of the former
State may be interested in such business.
1108 Vol. 32:1105
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Supreme Court later held, however, that the requisite degree of
"business" would be deemed present when an agent has been ap-
pointed expressly to receive service of process20 or when solicitation
of orders within the state is accompanied by certain additional ac-
tivities."'
A second legal basis on which jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions was asserted required the "presence" of the corporation within
the state. This concept was borrowed from Pennoyer v. Neff,2 which
held that the authority of every tribunal is restricted by the terri-
torial limits in which it is established-although every state pos-
sesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and prop-
erty within its jurisdiction, no state can exercise direct jurisdiction
over persons or property outside its limits. 23 Five years after
Pennoyer, the Court applied this doctrine to personal judgments of
state courts against foreign corporations.2 Recognizing the artifi-
ciality of the "presence" concept as applied to corporations rather
than natural persons, the Court held that service can be made only
upon an agent of that corporation, and that such service must be
accompanied by proof that the corporation was doing business in
the state.25 An indication of the amount of business activity within
a state sufficient to manifest "presence" was provided in
Id. at 22-23. See also Newell v. Great W. Ry. Co., 19 Mich. 336 (1869), in which the Michigan
court refused to sanction service on a corporate agent who was only casually in the state, and
who was not carrying on corporate business there.
20. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
The Court distinguished Old Wayne, in which the foreign corporation neither appointed an
agent for service nor was doing business within the state, holding that service is proper
whether or not the business out of which the action arose was local if an agent had been
expressly appointed. This distinction between express and implied consent, and the fictional
use of implied consent as a jurisdictional basis, proved to be longstanding objections to the
consent rationale as a basis for assumption of judicial jurisdiction.
21. If the solicitors were authorized to receive payment, Reynolds v. Missouri, Kan. &
Tex. Ry., 224 Mass. 379, 113 N.E. 413 (1916), 228 Mass. 379, 117 N.E. 913 (1917), aff'd mem.
255 U.S. 565 (1921), or carried on substantial solicitation on a continuous basis, Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917), the corporations were held to be
"doing business" and subject to service of process. But see Green v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907), in which the Supreme Court held that mere solicitation of
orders subject to out-of-state acceptance or rejection did not constitute doing business in the
forum state.
22. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23. Id. at 722. The Court stated:
To give [proceedings for the protection and enforcement of private rights] any validity,
there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution-that is, by the law of its crea-
tion-to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determi-
nation of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdic-
tion by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.
Id. at 733.
24. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353 (1882).
25. Id. at 359.
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International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky.26 Characterizing the case
as a "close one," the Court stated:
Here was a continuous course of business in the solicitation of orders which
were sent to another State and in response to which the machines of the
Harvester Company were delivered within the State of Kentucky. This was a
course of business, not a single transaction. The agents not only solicited such
orders in Kentucky, but might there receive payment in money, checks or
drafts . . . . This course of conduct of authorized agents within the State in
our judgment constituted a doing of business there . . . .2
The paramount element in both the "consent" and "presence"
bases of judicial jurisdiction clearly was whether the foreign corpo-
ration was "doing business" in the forum state. Resolution of this
issue required a confusing factual compilation of the amount of
activity carried on within the state. Because this quantitative ap-
proach failed to evaluate the burden on a defendant corporation in
defending the suit, however, the courts sought a fairer test for per-
mitting the assumption of jurisdiction. The result was International
Shoe Co. v. Washington."8
B. Minimum Contacts and Fundamental Fairness: The Due
Process Standard
Dissatisfied with the imprecise nature of the "presence" and
"consent" concepts, and seeking a more practical test for determin-
ing jurisdiction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert, Inc.,2" contended that
"presence" actually contemplated both a quantitative evaluation of
the business done-continuous dealings in the state of the
forum-and an estimate of the resulting inconvenience from requir-
ing defense of the lawsuit in a particular forum. Rather than confuse
26. 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
27. Id. at 585-86. The Court distinguished Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry.,
205 U.S. 530 (1907), as involving "mere solicitation" rather than a continuous course of
business. The Court concluded:
We are satisified that the presence of a corporation within a State necessary to the
service of process is shown when it appears that the corporation is there carrying on
business in such sense as to manifest its presence within the State, although the business
transacted may be entirely interstate in its character.
234 U.S. at 589. "Presence," however, was found lacking in People's Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918). Stating the "general rule" that "the business must be of
such nature . . . as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the
local jurisdiction, and is by its duly authorized officers or agents present within the State"
when service is attempted. The Court determined that the foreign corporation's ownership
of stock in a local subsidiary, its continued advertising, and its use of soliciting agents within
the state did not amount to the doing of business sufficient to subject the corporation to
service of process. Id. at 87.
28. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
29. 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
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these inquiries with such terms as "presence" or "consent," how-
ever, the court suggested a new phraseology-whether the extent
and continuity of the local corporate activity made reasonable the
assumption of jurisdiction over the foreign corporation by the state's
courts.30 The court's emphasis on convenience proved to have a
significant impact on the Supreme Court.
In 1945, the Court decided International Shoe. Defendant, a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St.
Louis, was sued by the State of Washington for contributions alleg-
edly owed to a state unemployment fund. Although International
Shoe maintained no Washington office, made no contracts for sale
or purchase of merchandise there, and had no stock of merchandise
in the state, it carried on significant solicitation activities in Wash-
ington. Approximately twelve salesmen under the control of St.
Louis managers resided in Washington, exhibited shoe samples
there and solicited orders that subsequently were transmitted to St.
Louis. The cost of the display rooms in which these samples were
exhibited was reimbursed by International Shoe. Relying on earlier
decisions indicating that solicitation plus some additional activities
manifested corporate "presence" sufficient to render the corpora-
tion amenable to suit,3' the Washington Supreme Court held that
the company was doing business to a sufficient extent to subject
itself to process. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, formu-
lating a new standard that allowed defendants not "present" within
the forum to be nonetheless subjected to jurisdiction if certain mini-
mum contacts with the forum exist such that maintenance of the
suit did not offend" 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "32
30. Id. at 141. The court stated that "the loss and inconvenience to ordinary companies
from being sued wherever they may chance to have any dealings whatever, cannot properly
be ignored, and may constitute a test of jurisdiction . . . ." Id.
31. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P.2d 801 (1945). The
Washington court relied primarily on People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246
U.S. 79 (1918), International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), and Frene v.
Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943), all of which emphasized the sufficiency
of solicitation for purposes ofjudicial jurisdiction when in the context of a regular, continuous,
and sustained course of business.
32. 326 U.S. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). The Court's
rejection of the merely quantitative presence or consent tests was clear:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between these
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not,
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes
been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure
through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little less. Whether due process
is satisifed must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
1979] 1111
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One unanswered questions after International Shoe, however,
was under what circumstances a foreign corporation could be sub-
jected to jurisdiction with respect to a cause of action entirely unre-
lated to the corporation's activities within the forum. That issue was
addressed in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.," in
which a mining corporation had been forced to leave the Phillip-
pines during World War II. The corporation set up an office in Ohio
where files were kept, correspondence was maintained, salary
checks were drawn, secretaries were employed, stock was trans-
ferred, directors meetings were held, bank accounts were main-
tained, and the rehabilitation of the corporation was supervised.
The corporation was sued in Ohio for overdue dividends. The Court
upheld jurisdiction, relying on a statement in International Shoe to
the effect that, in some instances, corporate activity within a state
may be so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against
it on a cause of action unrelated to the activities carried on within
the forum.
The Supreme Court's expansion 5 of the permissible bases of a
state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations-from the early total
prohibition, to the artificial restrictions of consent and presence, to
the minimum contacts and fundamental fairness analysis of
International Shoe-was construed for a period as minimizing the
need for forum state activities by the foreign corporation when the
fundamental fairness element was deemed satisfied. This interpre-
tation reached its zenith in McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co."* In McGee a California resident had purchased life insurance
from an Arizona insurance company. Several years later a Texas
insurance company assumed the Arizona corporation's insurance
process clause to insure.
326 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
33. Although focusing on sufficiency of the contacts and fairness to the defendant, the
Court failed to define adequately the weight to be given each factor or the balance in which
the factors were to be held.
34. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
35. Recently, the First Circuit, in Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584 (1st
Cir. 1970), stated that Perkins was especially significant in that it went beyond and gave
specificity to International Shoe's concern with fairness to the corporation by stressing the
importance of continuous and systematic forum activities:
[Tihe meaning the Court attributed to these words can be understood only in light of
the care it manifested in scrutinizing the defendant's precise activities in the forum
before it reached the -conclusion that [jurisdiction was proper]. No such articulation
would have been needed if any minimal concept of presence, or doing business sufficient
to obtain jurisdiction for other types of claims, was thought sufficient for nonrelated
causes of action.
Id. at 587 (footnote omitted).
36. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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obligations. Upon the death of the insured, the Texas corporation
refused to pay. The beneficiary received a judgment against the
insurer in California, but Texas courts refused to enforce it, holding
the judgment void for lack of jurisdiction by the California court
over the Texas insurer. The insurer had never maintained an office
or agent in California, nor had it ever solicited or done any insurance
business in California other than to receive premium payments from
this particular insured. Despite these almost nonexistent contacts,
the Court stated that because of the increasing nationalization of
commerce and the consequent decrease in inconvenience of requir-
ing a party to defend itself in a state in which it engages in economic
activity, "a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the per-
missible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations."37 The
Court thus held that because the contract was delivered in Califor-
nia, the premiums were mailed from there, and the insured was a
California resident, the California courts could constitutionally ex-
ercise jurisdiction. After Mc Gee it appeared that a foreign corpora-
tion need be doing no business in the forum state to be subject to
its courts' jurisdiction.
In Hanson v. Denckla,"8 however, the Court retreated from its
broad holding in McGee, stating that "it is a mistake to assume that
this trend [toward expanding jurisdiction] heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts."" Whereas International Shoe and its progeny were con-
strued as emphasizing the need for fairness to and convenience for
defendants as opposed to the earlier quantitative evaluation of
defendant-forum contacts, the Court in Hanson felt compelled to
point out the importance of the latter element. The Court observed
that the due process clause, while providing immunity from incon-
venient or distant litigation, also places territorial limitations on the
power of states: "However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless
he has had the 'minimal contacts' with the State that are a prere-
quisite to its exercise of power over him." 0 The Court thus revived
the requirement of "doing business", finding it essential that there
be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invok-
ing the benefits and protections of its laws." 4'
37. Id. at 222.
38. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
39. Id. at 251.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 253.
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Various circuit court decisions have reiterated this requirement
that, although assumption of jurisdiction may not inconvenience a
foreign corporate defendant, the corporation must nonetheless be
carrying on the requisite amount of business within the forum state.
In Seymour v. Parke, Davis and Co. 42 a Michigan corporation was
sued by the representative of a Massachusetts resident who alleg-
edly died from ingesting a drug manufactured by the corporation.
The action was brought in a New Hampshire district court in order
to avoid the Massachusetts statute of limitations." Although the
defendant's activities" were assumed sufficient to constitute mini-
mum contacts, the First Circuit refused to permit adjudication of
the claim in the New Hampshire court. Demonstrating the interre-
lationship between the two factors-the state's sovereign authority
to adjudicate and the fundamental fairness to the defendant-the
court stated that because the defendant's New Hampshire activities
consisted only of advertising and employing solicitors, fairness
would not permit the assumption of jurisdiction." The court thus
42. 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1970).
43. Parke, Davis was admittedly "doing business" in Massachusetts to such a degree
as to be amenable to process there. Id. at 585.
44. Parke, Davis did no manufacturing in New Hampshire, maintained no office or
salesman, had no bank account, was not registered to do business in New Hampshire, and
had no agent to receive process there. A branch manager in Massachusetts, however, had
supervision over New Hampshire, and six salesmen, all of whom resided in New Hampshire,
worked for the defendant by visiting physicians, hospitals and other potential customers to
disseminate product information and to take orders, which were forwarded for acceptance to
Massachusetts. Id.
45. Although the court "assumed" the requisite minimum contacts, and based its hold-
ing on the grounds of unfairness, it nonetheless seemed unsatisfied with the authority of the
New Hampshire courts over the parties:
If the plaintiff has some attachment to the forum, or if the defendant has adopted
the state as one of its major places of business, we would have no question of the right
of the state to subject the defendant to suit for unconnected causes of action. Nor would
we even if the forum were not a major center of defendant's business but were neverthe-
less a community into whose business life the defendant had significantly entered as
determined by the quality, substantiality, continuity, and systematic nature of its activ-
ities.
Id. at 587.
The Third Circuit provided a clear explanation of the dual nature of International Shoe
in Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976):
International Shoe posited twin limitations upon the scope of state judicial power.
First, out of respect for values of federalism, the due process clause was held to forbid a
state to exercise its adjudicatory authority in a manner that would encroach upon the
sovereignty of a sister state. . . .
The second jurisdictional limitation interposed by the due process clause focuses
upon the parties and the burdens associated with litigating in a particular forum. This
limitation upon judicial power prevents a state of a plaintiff's choosing from coercing
defense of a suit in a forum which, because of its remoteness from defendant's residence
and from witnesses and proof, would be fundamentally unfair. . . .
These two limitations interact conjunctively. Thus a state may exercise its jurisdic-
1114
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seemed to regard the elements of contacts-the extent to which the
defendant is "doing business"-and fairness in a cumulative sense;
the more inconvenience to the defendant, the greater the amount of
business done in the forum state must be, and vice versa.
While a foreign corporation thus must be doing some business
in the forum state in order to be subject to that state's jurisdiction,
the issue whether corporate activities constitute the requisite
"minimum contacts" must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In
Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc." the court
noted that although due process defines a rather low threshold of
state interest sufficient to justify exercise of a state's sovereign deci-
sional authority, that threshold "is nonetheless real." 7 In Empire,
a Pennsylvania corporation conditioned the sale of goods to the
defendant Rhode Island corporation" upon receipt of a letter of
credit from defendant Rhode Island bank. When the buyer later
cancelled the order, the seller sued in Pennsylvania court to recover
from the buyer for breach of contract and from the bank for failing
to honor its letter of credit. The Third Circuit apparently found that
the bank had sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania to permit exer-
cise of jurisdiction,4 but nevertheless denied jurisdiction on grounds
of fairness, stating that the bank, by issuing its letter of credit, could
hardly have contemplated the resolution of any disputes anywhere
but in Rhode Island.50 As to the Rhode Island buyer, the court stated
that the Pennsylvania corporation could not circulate mail order
catalogues to distant states and then insist that individual custom-
ers respond in Pennsylvania to suits based on catalogue orders."1
tion in a manner consistent with values of federalism, but if that exercise would never-
theless be fundamentally unfair to the defendant, the power is void. Similarly, it may
not be unfair to subject a defendant to suit in a particular state, but if that state lacks
the requisite contacts with the parties or the subject matter, its assumption of jurisdic-
tion would impermissibly intrude upon another sovereign's right to have its courts adju-
dicate disputes of interest to it.
Id. at 1140. The Third Circuit therefore reversed a Pennsylvania court's assertion of jurisdic-
tion over property of a party having no contacts with the state, stating that jurisdiction could
not be defended simply because "Pennsylvania's proximity to New York does not make
defense there by a wealthy bank fundamentally unfair." Id. at 1142.
46. 567 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1977).
47. Id. at 557.
48. The Rhode Island corporation had ordered the goods by telephone from Rhode
Island. Id. at 556.
49. "[I]t cannot be said that Pennsylvania's interest is so insubstantial that its exer-
cise of decisional authority would impermissibly intrude on Rhode Island's right to have its
courts adjudicate." Id. at 558.
50. Id.
51. Because the two corporations allegedly had more contacts than mere isolated mail-
order transactions, however, the court remanded for consideration whether those additional
contacts were sufficient to support Pennsylvania jurisdiction. Id. at 558-59.
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Shaffe' v. Heitner2 provided additional support for the sub-
stantive reading given the International Shoe requirement of mini-
mum contacts. In applying this analysis to a quasi in rem action,"
the Court held that mere presence of property within the forum
state is not a sufficient contact if the cause of action is completely
unrelated to that property. Although the consequences of this hold-
ing may be more doctrinal than practical,"4 Shaffer demonstrates
the Court's desire to restrict to some degree the adjudicatory author-
ity of state courts-in other words, foreign corporations must be
doing a greater amount of business than previously thought neces-
sary in order to be amenable to service of process.
The foregoing historical analysis of the extent to which a foreign
corporation must be "doing business" in a state in order to be sub-
ject to that state's adjudicatory authority is instructive in that it
demonstrates two clear trends. From the rigid quantitative analysis
applied to foreign corporations in St. Clair v. Cox, to the rather
minimal requirement of convenience for the defendant suggested in
McGee, the element of "doing business" became almost nonexis-
tent. Cases since McGee, however, have restored the substance of
the requirement and thus required the cause of action to be based
either on a specific act of the foreign corporation in the forum or on
the corporation's engagement in a course of activity sufficiently
continuous to manifest an affirmative decision by the corporation
to avail itself of the benefits and protection of the forum state. While
the facts of each case are determinative, each court will probably
evaluate whether the defendant could reasonably have expected
under the circumstances to be served with process in the forum. The
term "minimum contacts," which previously appeared to be little
more than formalistic verbiage, now defines a threshold that, ac-
cording to the Shaffer Court and recent circuit court decisions,5 is
significant.
52. -433 U.S. 186 (1977).
53. Quasi in rem jurisdiction involves the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over prop-
erty located within that state in order to satisfy personal claims against the property owner
if the owner is not subject to the court's personal jurisdiction.
54. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAnv. L. REV. 71, 160 (1977) (noting that
while the mere presence of the defendant or his property in the forum state is probably
insufficient to support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to forum activities, "the presence
of either the defendant's person or his property will often signal other relationships with the
forum and the controversy that are adequate to support jurisdiction").
55. The circuit courts have noted this aspect of Shaffer. The Fifth Circuit read the
Shaffer decision as suggesting that the liberal construction of the International Shoe analysis
"may be evolving into a more conservative one, requiring, perhaps, even more contacts than
those present in McGee." Smith v. Lloyd's of London, 568 F.2d 1115, 1118 n.7 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Eighth Circuit reiterated the Court's holding in Shaffer, stating that when the claim sued
upon is unrelated to the defendant's forum activities, personal jurisdiction cannot be main-
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III. AmENABiLrry OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS TO STATE LEGISLATIVE
JURISDICTION5
A. Regulatory Legislation
Analysis of the validity of state regulatory control over foreign
corporations, whether in the form of qualification statutes or police
power measures designed for consumer safety, suffers more than
that of any other area of state jurisdiction from the lack of a defini-
tive standard."7 Due process analysis of regulatory legislation, unlike
that of tax legislation, is fairly minimal.58 The crucial issue is
whether the control sought to be exercised, or the consequences
thereof, results in an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce. The commerce clause analysis of regulation of foreign corpo-
rations, however, is imprecise in defining the point at which the
regulation becomes too burdensome. The following discussion will
demonstrate this imprecision.
1. The Qualification Requirement for Foreign Corporations
Courts confronted with allegations that a foreign corporation
was doing business without having qualified' have been hesitant to
find that business was done because of the severe consequences of
tained because the defendant has " 'no reason to expect to be haled before [the forum
state's] court[s]' " for litigation other than that arising out of its forum related activities.
Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1271 (8th Cir. 1978), quoting Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216. It is doubtful that this decision intends to suggest that the holding
in Perkins, see notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text, is no longer valid. Rather, it more
likely holds that in order for jurisdiction to be maintained over a cause of action unrelated
to the defendant's forum activities, the forum activities must be continuous and systematic,
such that defendant could reasonably expect to be subject to service of process in that forum.
For cases noting the significance of the minimum contacts/doing business aspect of state
court jurisdiction, see Pickens v. Hess, 573 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1978) and Intermeat, Inc. v.
American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
56. This term includes taxation, consumer protection and qualification statutes. While
this Note maintains the various subcategories of legislative jurisdiction for purposes of the
following discussion of their historical development, the general heading of "legislative juris-
diction" will be used to encompass all three for purposes of the proposed analysis, under
which all legislative jurisdiction over foreign corporations would be evaluated under the same
standard.
57. State legislative jurisdiction is limited by both the commerce and due process
clauses, as distinguished from judicial jurisdiction, which is subject only to due process
restrictions.
58. Tax legislation must first be justified under a more substantial due process nexus
with the subject of the taxation before addressing the question whether the tax imposed
unduly burdens interstate commerce. See notes 119-35 infra and accompanying text.
59. "Qualification" to do business may involve a number of requirements, depending
upon the particular state statute. A typical qualification statute may require the filing of an
application to do business within the state, payment of fees, consent to service of process
within the state, the filing of the corporation's certificate of incorporation, charter, or bylaws,
and numerous other formalities.
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such a finding. Most often such a finding results in denial of the
corporation's right to resort to the state courts. Additionally, fines
may be imposed upon the corporation, contracts made by the corpo-
ration during the. period of noncompliance may be declared void,
and in some instances the officers may be held individually liable
on corporate-obligations incurred in the state while the corporation
was not qualified to do business. Early decisions therefore required
a high degree of in-state activity before holding a corporation sub-
ject to what became referred to as "door-closing" statutes.
The leading case of International Textbook Co. v. Piggo demon-
strates this judicial reluctance to hold foreign corporations subject
to qualification statutes. In Pigg a Pennsylvania corporation pre-
pared and published textbooks and other instructional materials for
use in correspondence courses, and employed agents to solicit stu-
dents for the course and to collect payment from those students.
The company maintained no office in Kansas, although its agent
there procured an office at his own expense. When a Kansas student
failed to make payment, the corporation brought a breach of con-
tract action in Kansas. The student contended that the failure of
the corporation to comply with the Kansas qualification statute
precluded maintenance of the action. The defendant argued that
such requirements constituted an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce. Although the Supreme Court initially stated that
the company's Kansas activities "were not single or casual transac-
tions, such as might be deemed incidental to its general business as
a foreign corporation, but were parts of its regular business continu-
ously conducted,"" it ultimately held that the corporation was
doing business only in interstate commerce. Thus, to the extent the
Kansas statute required qualification by corporations engaged in
such commerce, it was found to violate the commerce clause.
Such characterization of local activities as only an aspect of an
overall interstate business became a typical device used by the
Court to avoid finding that a foreign corporation was doing business
for purposes of state qualification statutes. When the defendant in
Buck Stove and Range Co. v. Vickers62 interposed the plaintiffs
failure to qualify as a defense to maintenance of the action, the
Court stated, "It is the established doctrine of this Court that a
State may not . . . directly burden the prosecution of interstate
business. But such a burden is imposed when the corporation of
another State, lawfully engaged in interstate commerce, is required,
60. 217 U.S. 91 (1909).
61. Id. at 104.
62. 226 U.S. 205 (1912).
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as a condition of its right to prosecute its business" in a foreign
state, to comply with qualification statutes. 3 Similarly, in Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant," a Tennessee corporation pur-
chased grain in Kentucky for shipment to Tennessee. When the
corporation later brought suit in Kentucky against the Kentucky
seller for failure to deliver the grain, the seller contended that a
Kentucky door-closing statute not only precluded maintenance of
the suit but invalidated the contract itself. The Court, however,
again demonstrated the difficulty of proving that a foreign corpora-
tion is doing business for purposes of qualification statutes, stating
that interstate commerce includes not only transportation from one
state to another, but all commercial intercourse between different
states and all the component parts of that intercourse." Therefore,
although the contract was made in Kentucky, and was to be wholly
performed in Kentucky, the Court determined that because the
grain was to be shipped from Kentucky to Tennessee, the actual
purchase was only one aspect of an interstate transaction."
The question whether a foreign corporation could ever be en-
gaged in local business to an extent sufficient to permit a state to
require the corporation to qualify was answered affirmatively, how-
ever, in two later Supreme Court decisions. In Union Brokerage Co.
v. Jensen,7 a North Dakota corporation conducted a customhouse
brokerage business" in Minnesota dealing with the movement of
goods into and out of the country. When the corporation brought
suit in Minnesota against its former president for breach of fiduciary
obligations, the officer interposed in defense the disability of Union
to resort to Minnesota's courts for want of compliance with its quali-
fication statute. The Court sustained the defense, holding that
Union's business was localized in Minnesota because the corpora-
tion purchased materials and services from people in that state and
entered into various other business relationships wholly outside of
the arrangements it made with importers or exporters." The Court
63. Id. at 216.
64. 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
65. Id. at 290. The Court went on to say that:
A corporation of one State may go into another, without obtaining the leave or
license of the latter, for all the legitimate purposes of such commerce; and any statute
of the latter State which obstructs or lays a burden on the exercise of this privilege is
void under the commerce clause.
Id. at 291.
66. Id. at 292.
67. 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
68. The primary duty of a customhouse broker is to declare the contents and value of
goods being shipped into the country, permitting consignees of imported merchandise to
"make entry".
69. Id. at 208. The Court went on to say that "while the business of Union is that of a
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concluded ihat Minnesota's qualification requirement was valid
against Union because it merely sought to regularize the corpora-
tion's local activity.70
The Supreme Court again upheld application of a qualification
statute to a foreign corporation in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Say-On-
Drugs, Inc." Lilly, an Indiana corporation, brought suit in New
Jersey to enjoin the defendant from selling Lilly products below
established minimum prices. The defendant moved to dismiss on
the basis of Lilly's failure to qualify. Lilly's New Jersey contacts
were substantial-an office was maintained there, a salaried secre-
tary was employed, and eighteen salaried detail men resided in New
Jersey, whose duties included visiting pharmacists, physicians, and
hospitals to encourage use of Lilly products; taking orders from
these retailers for transmittal to New Jersey wholesalers of Lilly
goods; examining the inventory of retailers and recommending the
supplies needed; and providing free advertising for retail druggists.
Citing the New Jersey trial court, the Court stated that " 'to hold
under the facts above recited that plaintiff is not doing business in
New Jersey is to completely ignore reality.' "72 In distinguishing
between Lilly's interstate and local activities, the majority placed
heavy emphasis on Lilly's "domestic business" of inducing one
group of local merchants, the retailers, to buy supplies from another
group, the wholesalers of Lilly products.7 3
The dissent" argued that although Lilly's activities possibly
may have constituted "doing business" for purposes of taxation or
service of process, this case "falls in neither of those two categories."
The apparent basis of Douglas' dissent was that the activities in-
volved were actually nothing more than solicitation, which "has up
to this day been on the same basis as doing an interstate business,
so far as the protection of the Commerce Clause is concerned."7
Thus, the majority's distinction between "inducing" sales, a local
customhouse broker, its activities are not confined to its services at the port of entry. It has
localized its business, and to function effectively it must have a wide variety of dealings with
the people in the community." Id. at 210.
70. Id. at 211.
71. 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
72. Id. at 280, quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 57 N.J. Super. 291, 300,
154 A.2d 650, 655 (1959).
73. 366 U.S. at 285. Here Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, stated that the
systematic promotion of Lilly's products among those who could only purchase such products
from New Jersey wholesalers did not constitute interstate business that necessarily must be
unburdened.
74. Id. at 288-92. Justice Douglas was joined in his dissent by Justices Frankfurter,
Whittaker, and Stewart.
75. Id. at 290.
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activity, and "soliciting" sales, which was clearly interstate, was
unacceptable to the dissenters.
Subsequent lower court decisions, however, have shown no in-
tent to loosen the "doing business" requirement in qualification
statutes, either by distinguishing between "promoting" or
"inducing" and mere soliciting or otherwise. The Fifth Circuit re-
jected the defense of plaintiff's failure to qualify under a door-
closing statute even though the plaintiff had utilized salesmen ex-
tensively in the state, holding that if such salesmen are sent only
to promote interstate business, the foreign corporation is immune
from such regulation." The Sixth Circuit denied a similar- defense
when a Wisconsin corporation sued a Delaware corporation in Mich-
igan for breach of a contract that called for performance entirely
within Michigan." The court held that since the contract was ac-
tually entered into in Wisconsin, the entire transaction was inter-
state in character." A recent district court decision" demonstrated
not only the ambiguity of the term "doing business" for purposes
of qualification statutes, but also distinguished such usage from the
service of process context. Nevertheless, after defining the rather
minimal contacts necessary to confer personal judicial jurisdiction,
the court failed to elaborate on the apparently more substantial
activities necessary to require qualification.'
The Supreme Court again addressed this question in Allenberg
Cotton Co. v. Pittman." Allenberg, a cotton merchant, maintained
its principal office in Memphis. A substantial amount of its business
was conducted by sending purchase contracts to an independent
76. Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1972).
77. Alexander Mechanical Contractors Co. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 472 F.2d
834 (6th Cir. 1972). Owens-Corning was to supply labor and materials at a construction
project being performed by the plaintiff in Michigan.
78. Id. at 836-37; accord, Fred Hale Mach., Inc. v. Laurel Hill Lumber Co., 483 F.2d
58 (5th Cir. 1973). Plaintiff, a Louisiana corporation, sued a Mississippi corporation in Missis-
sippi for the balance due on a contract under which defendant had purchased certain equip-
ment from the plaintiff. In rejecting the defense of failure to qualify, the Fifth Circuit noted
that negotiations on the contract were conducted in both Louisiana and Mississippi and the
plaintiff had arranged to supply components for the equipment from Mississippi and Georgia
and had sent employees from Louisiana to Mississippi to assemble the equipment. These
additional factors transformed the contract into an interstate transaction that could not be
burdened by Mississippi qualification regulations.
79. Rose's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Rex Financial Corp., 383 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Ark.
1974).
80. The court noted that" 'doing business' for personal jurisdiction is completely differ-
ent from 'doing business' under the [qualification statute]." Id. at 944.
81. Rather, the court merely stated that because the contract sued upon was not en-
tered into in Arkansas, the Arkansas qualification statute did not apply to the transaction.
Id. at 944-45.
82. 419 U.S. 20 (1974).
1979] 1121
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
broker in Mississippi, who then would locate cotton farmers to com-
plete the contracts and sell their cotton to Allenberg. When one such
contracting farmer failed to deliver the cotton, Allenberg sued in
Mississippi and a door-closing statute was raised in defense. The
Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the defense, rejecting a com-
merce clause challenge on the ground that this contract was wholly
intrastate in character. The court deemed irrelevant the fact that
the purchased cotton was to be immediately shipped in interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court reversed,83 stressing that Allenberg
had no Mississippi office, operated no warehouse there, and em-
ployed no solicitors in the state, but instead arranged all its con-
tracts through an independent broker. What the Mississippi court
had characterized as Allenberg's "perpetual inventory" in the state
was held by the Supreme Court to be nothing more than "cotton
which is awaiting necessary sorting and classification as a prerequis-
ite to its shipment in interstate commerce.""
The lower federal courts have, understandably, not yet dis-
cerned the Supreme Court's distinction between business that is
purely interstate and that which is sufficiently local to support ap-
plication of qualification requirements. For example, in Sar Manu-
facturing Co. v. Dumas Brothers Manufacturing Co.," the plaintiff
manufactured a product in Texas, Georgia, and Mississippi that
was subsequently sold in substantial amounts to the defendant in
Alabama. Plaintiff leased a warehouse in Alabama to receive, store,
and process the product, and in addition employed several full or
part-time employees there. When the plaintiff sued on a note exe-
cuted by the defendant in Alabama in payment of the product,
plaintiffs failure to qualify was raised as a defense. Citing Lilly, the
Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff's business had both interstate
and intrastate aspects and that its marketing and supply functions
were sufficiently localized to require the corporation to comply with
83. In doing so, the Court distinguished Jensen and Lilly on their facts. Id. at 32-33.
84. 419 U.S. at 33. The Court's concluding comments further demonstrate the compara-
tively great amount of contacts a foreign corporation must have with a state before being
subject to its qualification requirements:
In short, appellant's contacts with Mississippi do not exhibit the sort of localization
or intrastate character which we have required in situations where a State seeks to
require a foreign corporation to qualify to do business. Whether there were local tax
incidents of those contacts which could be reached is a different question . . . . Whether
the course of dealing would subject appellant to suits in Mississippi is likewise a different
question . . . . We hold only that Mississippi's refusal to honor and enforce contracts
made for interstate or foreign commerce is repugnant to the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 33-34.
85. 526 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Alabama qualification statutes." Yet a 1977 district court decision"
defined interstate commerce in the qualification statute context in
such a way as to provide foreign corporations with almost total
immunity, stating that importation into one state from another is
the indispensable element of interstate commerce, and that every
negotiation, contract, trade, or dealing between citizens of different
states that contemplates and causes such importation is a transac-
tion of interstate commerce."
Defining "doing business" for purposes of amenability to quali-
fication statutes on the basis of lower federal and Supreme Court
decisions is an elusive task, primarily because of the failure of the
Court to provide a clear due process and commerce clause analysis
of the facts of each case. Although stating that "doing business" is
different for purposes of qualification and service of process, the
courts fail to clarify the constitutional reason for the difference. The
only fair conclusion that can be drawn from the cases, therefore, is
that, based on a rather nebulous conception of interstate commerce
as immune from state control-an interpretation of the commerce
clause that in most contexts has been abandoned-the courts re-
main extremely reluctant to subject foreign corporations to the se-
vere consequences that result from finding that the corporation has
engaged in local business without having qualified.
2. Amenability to Police Power Regulations
While most courts and commentators subdivide legislative ju-
risdiction over foreign corporations into the broad categories of tax-
ing and qualification statutes, the latter fails to account for a broad
variety of other legislation that is designed for consumer protection.
The "licensing" label, a description that more fully covers some of
these statutes, is also inadequate because consumer protection stat-
utes do not always require the licensing or qualification of the for-
eign corporation sought to be regulated. Furthermore, the activities
that constitute "doing business" for purposes of these statutes are
often considerably less significant than those required before a for-
eign corporation must qualify. Therefore, while the following discus-
sion of police power regulations may appear in some instances to
overlap with the qualification context, the distinction is drawn on
the basis of the somewhat broader latitude given the legislatures in
86. Id. at 1285-86.
87. Unlaub Co. v. Sexton, 427 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Ark. 1977).
88. Id. at 1365-66, citing Furst & Thomas v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493 (1931). The court
went on to say that interstate commerce comprehends all the component parts of commercial




The basis for permitting legislative control over foreign corpora-
tions engaging in what is admittedly interstate commerce is rooted
in the longstanding rule that the commerce clause, in conferring on
Congress power to regulate commerce, did not entirely withdraw
from the states the power to regulate matters of local concern with
respect to which Congress has not. exercised its power."' The clarity
of this holding was disrupted temporarily in Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania,0 in which a Pennsylvania statute requiring that sell-
ers of steamship tickets be licensed was ruled unconstitutional as a
"direct burden" on interstate commerce. The case is perhaps most
noteworthy because of the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone, who
stated:
The recognition of the power of the states to regulate commerce within
certain limits is a recognition that there are matters of local concern which
may properly be subject to state regulation and which, because of their local
character, as well as their number and diversity, can never be adequately dealt
with by Congress."
Stone criticized the traditional test of the limit of state ac-
tion-whether the alleged interference with commerce is direct or
indirect-and concluded that "indirect" simply described a conclu-
sion that, based on a consideration of the nature of the regulation,
its function, the character of the business involved, and the actual
effect on the flow of commerce, the challenged regulation concerns
peculiarly local interests and does not infringe the national interest
in maintaining the freedom of interstate commerce.9 2
Justice Stone's position prevailed in California v. Thompson,"
in which he wrote the majority opinion. In Thompson the Court
deemed valid a California statute requiring licensure of transporta-
tion agents," noting that the statute was neither a revenue measure
nor an attempt to increase the cost of transportation. Rather, the
89. E.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 12 How. 298 (1851); Willson v. Black-
bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 2 Pet. 152 (1829).
90. 273 U.S. 34 (1927). See also Shaffer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925), in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a North Dakota law that regulated the marketing of
wheat because approximately 90% of the wheat purchased was shipped in interstate com-
merce.
91. 273 U.S. at 44. DiSanto was subsequently overruled in California v. Thompson, 313
U.S. 109 (1941). See notes 93-96 infra and accompanying text.
92. 273 U.S. at 44. Stone's objections to the artificial concept of direct versus indirect
arose, perhaps more prominently, in the context of tax legislation. See, e.g., notes 136-61 infra
and accompanying text.
93. 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
94. A transportation agent was defined in the statute as one who "sells or offers to sell
or negotiate for" transportation over the public highways of the state. Id. at 111.
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statute was simply an attempt "to safeguard the members of the
public desiring to secure transportation by motor vehicle, who are
peculiarly unable to protect themselves from fraud and overreach-
ing . . . ."'1 Such a regulation, though unavoidably affecting inter-
state commerce, was held to deal primarily with a matter of local
concern that was a proper subject of state control."
The Court has made clear, however, that a state may not legis-
late under the guise of its police powers to promote the economic
welfare of its citizens or to guard them against price competition
from interstate rivals. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc." the New
York Milk Control Act set minimum prices to be paid to producers
of milk consumed within the state. Justice Cardozo rejected the
argument that the regulation was intended to provide sanitary secu-
rity rather than to provide economic protection for local producers,
stating that "[e]conomic welfare is always related to health, for
there can be no health if men are starving."" Holding that com-
merce is unduly burdened when one state indirectly regulates the
price to be paid to producers in another, the Court commented that
"one state . . . may not place itself in a position of economic isola-
tion.""
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia'00 provided a rare in-
stance in which the due process clause was raised as a restraint on
state regulatory authority. Plaintiff, a mail-order insurance busi-
95. Id. at 112-13.
96. Stone provided an exhaustive list of decisions in which the Court had upheld the
following state regulations:
A state may license trainmen engaged in interstate commerce in order to insure their
skill and fitness. It may define the size of crews manning interstate trains, and prescribe
regulations for payment of their wages. It may require interstate passenger cars to be
heated and guard posts to be placed on bridges of an interstate railroad. It may limit
the speed of interstate trains within city limits. It may require an interstate railroad to
eliminate grade crossings. It may pass local quarantine laws applicable to merchandise
moving in interstate commerce, as a means of protecting local health. It may regulate
and protect the safe and convenient use of its harbors and navigable waterways unless
there is conflict with some act of Congress. It may regulate pilots and pilotage in its
harbors. Where, as here, Congress has not entered the field, a state may pass inspection
laws and regulations, applicable to articles of interstate commerce, designed to safe-
guard the inhabitants of the state from fraud, provided only that the regulation neither
discriminates against nor substantially obstructs the commerce.
Id. at 113-14 (citations omitted).
97. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
98. Id. at 523.
99. Id. at 527. See also Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Louisiana Milk
Comm'n, 365 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. La. 1973). In Schwegmann Bros. the court similarly
differentiated between regulations intended to provide economic benefit and those regulating
for the welfare of its citizens.
100. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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ness incorporated in Nebraska, had approximately 800 Virginia
members receiving health benefits. Virginia sought to subject this
organization to its Blue Sky Law in order to protect its citizens from
"unfairness, imposition or fraud" in the sale of insurance certifi-
cates. Measuring plaintiffs contacts and ties with Virginia in ac-
cordance with International Shoe, the Court held that subjection of
the corporation to state regulatory jurisdiction was consistent with
"fair play and substantial justice" and thus not offensive to the due
process clause.0 ' Justice Douglas, although concurring in the result,
argued that the due process clause set different nexus standards for
regulatory and judicial jurisdiction, stating that "what is necessary
to sustain a tax or to maintain a suit . . . is not in my view determi-
nitive when the state seeks to regulate solicitation within its bor-
ders." 102 While this is no doubt true, the logical explanation lies not
in a varying due process standard for each, but from a determina-
tion under the commerce clause that, with respect to state legisla-
tion, the state interest in exercising the control does not outweigh
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce.
Two recent related circuit court decisions not only upheld the
broad authority of a state to regulate pursuant to its police power,
but analyzed the relatively limited relationship between the state
and the foreign corporation necessary for the state to regulate con-
sistently with due process. In Aldens, Inc. v. Packelo3 Pennsylvania
sought to subject an Illinois corporation operating a mail-order busi-
ness to regulation that would have cost the corporation approxi-
mately $800,000 per year, primarily consisting of lost finance
charges resulting from Pennsylvania's interest limits. Plaintiff
argued that due process prohibited Pennsylvania's regulation of
plaintiff's transactions because the state lacked the requisite mini-
mum interest.0 ' The court, noting that the contours of the due
process limitation had been defined primarily in service of process
cases, held that Pennsylvania's interest in the finance charges paid
by its citizens was substantial enough to satisfy the due process
objection to the regulation.0 ' Aldens, however, argued that the more
rigid due process standard applied to tax legislation was applicable
101. Id. at 648-49.
102. Id. at 653.
103. 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975).
104. Aldens had no tangible property in Pennsylvania, employed no agents, salesmen,
canvassers, or solicitors there, and advertised in Pennsylvania only through mail-order cata-
logues. Id. at 41.
105. Id. at 44.
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rather than the low threshold of state interest defined in the service
of process cases."o' The court rejected this contention, stating:
Tax cases . . . come in for special due process scrutiny. No state interest rates
so high in the state scale of values as the state sovereign's fisc. At the same
time no extraterritorial manifestation of sovereignty . . . is quite so offensive
to common notions of its tefritorial limits . . . . There is simply no reason why
in weighing the significance of that interest for due process purposes we should
impose on Pennsylvania the higher burden it would have to meet in a tax
collection case. 07
The Third Circuit pointed out in its discussion of Aldens' com-
merce clause challenge the analytical inadequacy of previous deci-
sions, stating that judicial reasoning was more influenced by the
political philosophy of the court with respect to the commerce
clause than in any other area of constitutional law.' The court
nevertheless felt compelled to attempt an analytical framework to
avoid "the even more futile exercise of color-matching the stipu-
lated facts in this case to the commerce clause cases which appear
to glow with the most nearly similar hue.""' The court suggested
that the commerce clause limited state exercise of legislative control
with respect to interstate commerce whenever (1) Congress has al-
ready legislated, or (2) Congress has not legislated but (a) the sub-
ject matter of the legislation requires a uniform national rule, or (b)
the state legislation discriminates against interstate commerce, or
(c) the state legislation burdens interstate commerce in excess of
any value attaching to the state's interest in imposing its regula-
tion."0 The court then rejected Aldens' argument that the facts of a
tax case"' and a qualification casell2 most nearly "color-matched"
the facts of this police power case, holding that tax and qualification
statutes are paradigms of category 2(c), while police power regula-
tions are justified since the state interest in regulating outweighs the
relatively slight burden resulting on interstate commerce."3
Aldens made similar due process and commerce clause chal-
106. The plaintiff placed reliance on the due process standard announced in National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), and Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.,
311 U.S. 435 (1940), which required that the state give something for which it can ask return
before taxation would be consistent with the due process clause. 524 F.2d at 43.
107. Id. at 43-44.
108. Characterizing an attempt to classify the Supreme Court's commerce clause adju-
dications for purposes of analytical application "an exercise in futility", the Third Circuit
stated that "an opinion from one era may reflect an evaluation of the relative weight to be
given to local versus national interests that a later court has rendered obsolete." Id. at 45.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 45-46.
111. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1966).
112. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974).
113. 524 F.2d at 49-50.
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lenges against the Wisconsin Consumer Act in Aldens, Inc. v.
LaFollette.'" Addressing the due process claim, the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged the existence of a threshold nexus between a state
and the subjects of that state's legislative efforts that must be met
in order to support legislative control. The court suggested, how-
ever, that "the connection between a state and the regulated person
must be of a more substantial character than the 'minimum con-
tacts' needed to support judicial process."' 15 Despite application of
the more rigid standard, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless found
Wisconsin's interest in protecting its own citizens from usurious
credit terms sufficient to meet due process minimums."
The court's analysis of the commerce clause question was
equally confused. Although properly drawing distinctions between
tax, qualification, and police power statutes, the court incorrectly
stated that application of tax and qualification statutes to purely
interstate traders is per se an undue burden, while the validity of
police power legislation depends upon a balancing of the effects on
interstate commerce in relation to local benefits. Such a holding
contravenes the commerce clause language in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,"n' which was cited by the court and which
permitted state taxation of the in-state aspects of purely interstate
commerce.
Despite the confusion in the Seventh Circuit's decision, most
cases consistently indicate that due process limitations on state
regulatory authority are based on the same concerns for fundamen-
tal fairness that exist in service of process cases. Additionally, the
commerce clause requires that the regulation be justified in light of
its burdens on interstate commerce. Unlike the qualification cases,
in which this balancing seldom resulted in upholding application of
the statute, police power regulations invariably are deemed justi-
fied.
B. Tax Legislation
State taxation of foreign corporations is similarly restricted by
both the due process and commerce clauses. The former defines an
initial threshold of interrelationship-a nexus-that the state must
114. 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
115. Id. at 751. For this proposition, the court cited Justice Douglas' concurrence in
Travelers Health without reference to the contrary position of the majority. See text accompa-
nying notes 100-02 supra.
116. In a footnote, the court remarked that exercise of the police power requires less of
a nexus than a state's power to tax, thus establishing yet a third level of "minimum contacts"
for due process purposes. 552 F.2d at 751 n.12.
117. 430 U.S. 274 (1977); see text accompanying notes 159-62 infra.
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have with the foreign corporation before it constitutionally may
demand that the corporation bear its fair share of state costs. Once
this "nexus" is established, the commerce clause serves to insure
that the state exaction roughly approximates the benefits resulting
to the corporation from its relationship with the taxing state. The
following discussion will develop the controversial evolution that
recently culminated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, "8 in
which the Court dispelled any remaining doubts that foreign corpo-
rations engaged in either local or interstate commerce may be sub-
ject to the state power to tax.
1. Due Process Clause Restrictions
Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Su-
preme Court recognized the limiting requirement that state taxing
authority was conditioned on its jurisdiction over the subject of the
tax. In Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co."' a shipping company
incorporated in New York sought to recover taxes paid to California
for use of the ports of that state. The Court sustained plaintiff's
challenge on grounds remarkably similar to the "doing business"
language of later due process rulings: "We are satisifed that the
state of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the
purpose of taxation; they were not, properly, abiding within its lim-
its . . .; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade
and commerce with their situs at the home [New York] port
. . . ."120 Even subsequent to adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, natural-law conceptions of "jurisdiction" and "situs" served
to limit state taxation of nonresidents. In an 1868 decision'2' the
Court denied Pennsylvania the right to tax bonds, payment of which
was secured by a railroad line running between Maryland and Penn-
sylvania, on the ground that to sustain the tax would give effect to
acts of the Pennsylvania legislature "upon property and interests
lying beyond her jurisdiction."122 Not until Louisville and Jefferson-
ville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky'2 was the due process clause proffered
as a limit on the state taxing power. In Louisville and Jeffersonville
Ferry Co. a tax levied by Kentucky on a corporation engaged in the
business of ferrying between Indiana and Kentucky was held uncon-
stitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of law
118. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
119. 58 U.S. 596, 17 How. 625 (1854).
120. Id. at 599-600, 17 How. at 628-29.
121. Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868).
122. Id. at 268.
123. 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
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because the tax was not related to a subject within the jurisdiction
of the taxing government.'
The first major upheaval concerning due process limitations on
state taxing power occurred in 1930, when the Court in Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota'" held that only one state could
have a sufficient nexus with any intangible to permit taxation. As
a result of this due process prohibition of "double taxation," the
Court was forced to act as arbiter of competing state attempts to
tax corporations, their interstate transactions, and their intangible
property."' This role was short-lived, however, as the prohibition of
double taxation ended in Curry v. McCanless. 27 With his character-
istic disdain for legal fictions, Justice Stone noted that state taxa-
tion jurisdiction simply depended upon whether that state conferred
benefits and protection upon the owner of the subject of the tax that
enabled the owner to enjoy the fruits of his ownership. Such protec-
tion and benefits are not always conferred by a single state; for
example, "taxation of a corporation by a state where it does busi-
ness . . . does not preclude the state of incorporaton from imposing
a tax." 28 Justice Stone thus held that the fourteenth amendment
did not compel the mechanical location of a single situs for every
taxing subject; such a requirement would infringe upon powers that
had not been withdrawn from the states.'2
The Curry test-whether the taxing state furnished protection
to or exercised control over the subject of its tax-was expanded in
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.1o In upholding the constitutionality
of a Wisconsin tax on the privilege of declaring and receiving divi-
dends out of income derived from property located and business
transacted in Wisconsin,'3 ' Justice Frankfurter stated that a state
is free to pursue its own fiscal policies without interference from the
due process clause if by the practical operation of the tax the state
has exerted its power in relation to opportunities it has given, to
protection it has afforded, and to benefits it has conferred by the
fact of being an orderly, civilized society.132 The Court characterized
such terms as "taxable event", "jurisdiction to tax," "business
124. Id. at 398.
125. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
126. This role as arbiter required the fixing of a single and exclusive locus for the
taxation of each type of intangible. See HELUESEm, supra note 2, at 693.
127. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
128. Id. at 368.
129. See also Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
130. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
131. The Court remanded for a determination on the application of the statute to the
specific dividends involved. Id. at 446.
132. Id. at 444.
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situs," and "extraterritoriality" as "compendious ways of implying
the impotence of state power because state power has nothing on
which to operate."1 33
Curry and J. C. Penney represent the current doctrine with re-
spect to due process limitations on state authority to tax foreign
corporations. Some disputes remain, however, with regard to
whether "doing business" for purposes of amenability to state taxa-
tion is a physical or an economic concept. For example, may a state
tax a foreign corporation that seeks to exploit the consumer market
in that state by engaging in extensive advertising through either the
broadcast or printed media in the absence of any corporate offices
or agents within the state?34 Apart from these issues, however, the
judicial evolution of due process restraints on state taxation has
seen the refinement of the original concepts of "jurisdiction" and
"situs" as the basis for the power to tax by the introduction of
notions of "protection" and "control". Because modem taxing stat-
utes invariably apportion the subject of the tax in an attempt to levy
only upon that aspect of the foreign corporation's business upon
which the state has conferred the protection of its laws, due process
challenges typically argue that the tax is so excessive as to consti-
tute a tax on property that is not within the state's jurisdiction.
With but one exception, 3 1 this challenge has been rejected. Never-
theless, due process clearly defines a more rigid standard for evalua-
tion of tax legislation than for service of process cases, a distressing
fact in light of the room left for ad hoc judgments as to the social
desirability of particular taxing statutes.
2. Commerce Clause Restrictions
Upon determining that the taxing state has a sufficient "nexus"
with the foreign corporation to permit taxation consistent with due
process, the validity of the tax under the commerce clause must be
ascertained. Resolution of this question historically has required a
balancing of the revenue needs of the states against the require-
ments of a unified, national economy. This balancing has been a
dynamic process, changing in pace with the rapid expansion into an
interstate economy and the increased revenue needs of the states.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551 (1977); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
135. See Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931), in which a North
Carolina apportionment formula resulted in a tax being levied on 80% of the corporation's
net income, despite proof that only 17% of Hans Rees' income was truly attributable to North
Carolina. Thus the Supreme Court held the tax violative of the due process clause. But see
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
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Initially courts resolved the commerce clause balance entirely
in favor of the national interest is free trade. Unlike application of
the commerce clause to state regulatory legislation, which permit-
ted the regulation of foreign corporations when the local interest
therein was deemed superior to the need for a unified national econ-
omy, courts applying the commerce clause to state or local taxation
flatly prohibited any tax affecting interstate commerce. In Robbins
v. Shelby County Taxing District,a"I Tennessee sought to tax a sales
representative of an Ohio corporation who was engaged in solicita-
tion in Memphis. The Court noted a number of different permissible
means by which state regulations could affect interstate com-
merce, but held that a state could not impose taxes upon persons
temporarily within the state. Until recently, the Court has adhered
to this "free trade"'" treatment of commerce clause restrictions on
state taxation: "no state has the right to lay a tax on interstate
commerce in any form, . . . and the reason is that such taxation is
a burden on that commerce.""'
Within this broad prohibition of "taxes affecting interstate
commerce," however, the Court drew a formalistic distinction be-
tween taxes having "direct" as opposed to "indirect" effects. While
the cases prohibiting direct taxation established an area of trade
free of state and local license, franchise, and privilege taxes,10 prop-
erty taxes and taxes in lieu of property taxes were upheld as indirect
levies as applied to all businesses.' The ambiguity of this artificial
verbalization of the conclusion that the taxing state was warranted
in levying its tax proved to be the ultimate downfall of the "free
136. 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
137. A state may provide "for the security of lives, limbs, health, and comfort of persons
and the protection of property"; it may regulate highways, railroads, and other commercial
facilities despite the incidental affect on commerce; it may pass inspection laws to secure the
"quality and measure of products"; it may pass "laws to regulate or restrict the sale of articles
deemed injurious to the health or morals of the community"; it may impose taxes upon
"persons residing within the state or belonging to its population, and upon avocations and
employment pursued therein, not directly connected with foreign or interstate commerce";
it may impose taxes on property within its borders. Id. at 493.
138. [I]n the matter of interstate commerce the United States are but one coun-
try, and are and must be subject to one system of regulations, and not to a multitude of
systems. The doctrine of the freedom of that commerce . . . is so firmly established that
it is unnecessary to enlarge further upon the subject.
Id. at 494.
139. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).
140. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918); Leloup v. Port
of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489
(1887).
141. See, e.g., Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897); Pullman's Palace Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
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trade" approach, when it was later attacked by Justices Stone and
Rutledge.
As businesses expanded their geographic scope in the twentieth
century, "state lines lost much of their economic importance." 42
Concurrently, the constantly increasing demands upon the states
for schools, roads, relief, and other social services forced them to
seek out every available source of revenue. 4 Recognizing these real-
ities, the Supreme Court briefly broke from the traditional view of
the immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation in
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue.14 Sustaining a state
privilege tax levied on the gross receipts of a publication located in
that state but distributed nationwide, Justice Stone issued his prag-
matic view that "it was not the purpose of the Commerce Clause to
relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share
of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing busi-
ness. 'Even interstate business must pay its way.' "145 According to
Stone, the commerce clause was intended to protect interstate com-
merce from the risk of cumulative burdens not borne by local com-
merce.'" Thus, multiple taxation was the consequence sought to be
prevented; in its absence, taxation of foreign corporations did not
create the trade barriers between states that the commerce clause
was designed to eliminate.14 7
The multiple taxation doctrine was repudiated eight years later
in Freeman v. Hewit. 'a Acknowledging that the commerce clause
permitted police power regulation of local aspects of interstate com-
merce because of the state need to safeguard vital local interests,
the Court nevertheless distinguished the power to tax. "Because the
greater or more threatening burden of a direct tax on commerce is
coupled with the lesser need to a State of a particular source of
revenue, attempts at such taxation have always been more carefully
scrutinized and more consistently resisted than police power regula-
142. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 237.
143. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business, 13
VAND. L. REV. 21 (1959).
144. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
145. Id. at 254.
146. Id. at 256.
147. The Court provided further support for this approach in McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), noting that although the particular tax in ques-
tion had some effect on interstate commerce, the Court was forced to reconcile competing
constitutional demands-that commerce between the states not be unduly impeded by state
action, and that the power to lay taxes for the support of state government not be unduly
curtailed-and did so in favor of the state's right to tax.
148. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
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tions . . . ."I' The Court thus refused to find any support for the
notion that a state may exact even "one single-tax-worth" of direct
interference with the free flow of commerce.' The Court's reimple-
mentation of the "free trade" doctrine was attended by restoration
of the formalistic distinction between direct and incidental effects
on commerce. This formalism was most apparent in Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor,' which involved a commerce clause chal-
lenge to a state tax imposed upon a foreign corporation for the
privilege of doing business within the state, measured by that part
of corporate net income reasonably attributable to the corporation's
in-state activities. Although the measure of the tax was not chal-
lenged as an unreasonable approximation of income derived from
those activities,5 2 the Court found it unconstitutional because of the
"all-important 'operating incidence' of the tax"" 5 -the tax was lev-
ied on the privilege of doing interstate business, a direct rather than
incidental burden on interstate commerce. The dissent,' however,
articulated the artificial nature of the decision:
[T]he tax is declared invalid simply because the State has verbally character-
ized it as a levy on the privilege of doing business within its borders . . . .
[Had it been described] as one for the use of highways or in lieu of an ad
valorem property tax, Spector would have had to pay the same amount, calcu-
lated in the same way, as is sought to be collected here.'
The reversion to the tax-free-haven philosophy of commerce
clause limitations on state taxing powers finally ended in the com-
panion cases of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc."'
149. Id. at 253.
150. Id. at 256.
151. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
152. The tax in fact was assumed to be nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned, and not
an undue burden on interstate commerce.
153. Id. at 605-06.
154. The dissent was delivered by Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Douglas.
Id. at 610-15.
155. Id. at 611. The dissent went on to say that Spector's tax immunity would continue
only until Connecticut "renames or reshuffles its tax." The dissent was proven correct by the
two Railway Express Agency decisions. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S.
434 (1959) (REA II); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) (REA 1).
In REA I, the Court struck down a Virginia license tax levied annually on the privilege of
doing business in Virginia, measured by gross receipts. Five years later in REA II, however,
the Court upheld Virginia's reworded version of the statute, which altered the all-important
operating incidents by placing the tax on the intangible property of the foreign corporation
in the form of its "going concern" value as measured by gross receipts. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Clark acknowledged that "magic words or labels" could "disable an other-
wise constitutional levy." 358 U.S. at 441.
156. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Both cases involved net income taxes levied on foreign corpo-
rations doing business in the taxing state.
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Although adhering to the view that the privilege of doing interstate
business could not be taxed,5 7 the Court held that a state could
exact a fair demand for that aspect of the interstate commerce to
which it bore a special relation. Such a result was achieved by an
apportionment formula that was devised to ascertain the amount of
the corporation's net income attributable to its activities within the
taxing state. The Court, however, laid down certain requirements
for constitutional validity. The due process limitation, which re-
quired that the tax exacted roughly approximate the benefits and
protections conferred, provided the threshold restriction. To then
withstand the commerce clause challenge, the tax must not discrim-
inate against interstate commerce in favor of local business. This
requirement was achieved by restoring a modified version of Justice
Stone's cumulative burdens test. The Northwestern Cement deci-
sion, however, required invalidation of the tax only if actual multi-
ple burdens existed, rather than on the risk of such burdensome
taxation, in order to avoid conferring a tax advantage on interstate
commerce not shared by local businesses. 8
An interesting aspect of this evolution of commerce clause re-
strictions on state taxing power is the similarity between the com-
merce clause and the due process standards of validity. Due process
requires something more than minimum contacts for service of pro-
cess; the tax demanded must roughly approximate the protection
conferred or the control exercised by the taxing state. Similarly,
validity of tax measures under the commerce clause depends upon
proper apportionment of the subject of the tax such that there is no
opportunity for multiple taxation. Under both standards, the ulti-
mate limitation appears to be that the state can tax only what is
justly attributable to it.
This similarity became identity in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady,'"I in which the Court put an end to commerce clause
restrictions based on statutory form rather than effect. Mississippi
had levied a tax on the privilege of doing business within the state
measured by a fraction of Complete Auto Transit's gross income.
Plaintiff did not allege that the taxed activity did not have a suffi-
cient nexus with Mississippi, that the tax discriminated against
interstate commerce, that the tax was unfairly apportioned, or that
the tax was unrelated to services provided by Mississippi."o Rather,
157. The Court distinguished Spector Motor Service. Id. at 463-64.
158. Id. at 463. The Court stated: "There is nothing to show that multiple taxation is
present."
159. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
160. Id. at 277-78.
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based entirely on Spector Motor Service and Freeman v. Hewit, the
plaintiff simply claimed that a tax on the privilege of engaging in
an activity in the state is unconstitutional when that activity is part
of interstate commerce. The Court refused to invalidate the tax
based solely on the formal phrasing of the statute, announcing in-
stead that such legislation should be judged by its economic ef-
fects."' Overruling Spector Motor Service, the Court departed at
last from the formalistic distinctions between taxing statutes that,
although nominally distinguishable, had identical effects. In imple-
menting the benefit principle-that the tax exacted must be fairly
related to the services provided by the state-the Court has devel-
oped a fairness test that is essentially the same under both the
commerce and due process clauses.
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Varying Degrees of "Doing Business"
As the preceding discussions illustrate, state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations continues to vary in breadth according to the
nature of the control desired. Judicial jurisdiction-the authority to
serve process on a foreign corporation-still demands the least sub-
stantial degree of relationship between the forum state and the de-
fendant to permit its exercise. Although the requirement of
"minimum contacts" briefly appeared to have been replaced by the
notion that service is valid when a defendant is not inconvenienced
by subjection to the state's jurisdiction,12 subsequent decisions have
demonstrated that the due process threshold is real and significant.
The foreign corporation must be conducting its activities within the
state on a continuous basis; casual, isolated transactions will not
suffice.
Amenability of foreign corporations to legislative jurisdiction
requires a more substantial relationship, although the precise scope
of such jurisdiction is seldom clear. The degree of activity necessary
to constitute "doing business," essentially a due process issue, var-
ies with the nature of the legislation. For due process purposes the
state may apply police power regulations designed to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry of the regulating state on
the basis of no more substantial a relationship with the foreign
corporation than is required for service of process.'63 The validity of
161. The Court relied heavily on the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 259 (1946).
162. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see notes 36-39supra
and accompanying text.
163. See notes 114-17 supra and accompanying text. But see Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette,
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the regulation, however, is not established by so minimal a test. The
commerce clause requires that legislation not excessively burden
interstate commerce in relation to the local benefits conferred on the
corporation by the state. Because of the powerful state interest in
the proper exercise of its police power, however, this balancing of
benefits and burdens typically is resolved by requiring compliance
with the regulation.
Tax legislation must overcome a more significant due process
hurdle. No state may exact a tax that is disproportionate to the
control exercised over, or the protection conferred on, that foreign
corporation by the taxing state. This issue arises in the context of
the taxation of a corporation that is "doing business" in several
states. While all may tax the corporation consistent with the due
process clause, the taxes must be apportioned in such a way that
the exaction roughly approximates the amount of business done
within the particular state. Although this standard is considerably
more complex than that applied in service of process cases, few
states promulgate tax legislation that is so arbitrary as to violate the
standard.'" Resolution of a commerce clause challenge to the appli-
cation of tax legislation to foreign corporations involves a similar
analysis-the tax must be fairly apportioned so as not to subject the
corporation to multiple burdens. Thus underlying both standards is
essentially the same concern that states receive only those revenues
that are justly attributable to in-state activity.
Amenability of foreign corporations to qualification statutes
receives, for some reason, distinct treatment from other forms of
legislative control. Although courts engage in lengthy "doing busi-
ness" analysis in which they delineate and evaluate all in-state
corporate activity, there is no hint that the purpose is to establish
a due process nexus between corporation and state. Rather, conclu-
sions, based entirely on the commerce clause, typically hold that the
corporation was not "doing business" to a sufficient extent to re-
quire compliance with the qualification statute. In this context, in
which statutes are construed most strictly in favor of the foreign
corporation, clear constitutional analysis is most deficient.
B. Doing Away with "Doing Business" '
The concept of "doing business" was an artificial device created
in the 1800's for determining the circumstances under which a state
other than the state of incorporation could subject a corporation to
552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).




its sovereign control, either judicial or legislative. Since its creation
the fourteenth amendment has been adopted and the commerce
clause has undergone immense judicial transformation. Yet al-
though these flexible constitutional provisions should provide a sin-
gle mode of analysis of any state attempt to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign corporations, the outdated "doing business" concepts
prevent such consistent, logical analysis.
The historical development of state control over foreign corpo-
rations outlined in the foregoing discussions demonstrates the basis
for present difficulties. Early courts attempted to define state con-
trol in a physical or territorial sense. In order to do so, those litigat-
ing the "doing business" issue were required to show, on one side,
every conceivable connection the foreign corporation had with the
state, and, on the other side, the many factors demonstrating the
lack of localization. Courts would then engage in some sort of weigh-
ing to determine whether, in light of the evidence, the corporation
was "doing business." The inadequacy of this analysis forced modi-
fication, however, when the courts recognized the unfairness of sim-
ply "color-matching"'I the facts of "doing business" cases without
regard to the context in which the issues arose. As a result, three
distinct standards developed for evaluating the validity of state
authority-judicial, taxing, and regulatory-over foreign corpora-
tions, all of which were labeled "doing business."
The inevitable confusion these standards created could have
been avoided if the courts had evaluated state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations in terms of due process deprivation and inter-
ference with commerce rather than relied on the ambiguous concept
of "doing business." Unfortunately, the courts have felt compelled
to continue varying the impact of the analysis, now a constitutional
one, depending upon the context of the analysis. Where before there
had been three different definitions of "doing business," there now
are different levels of due process-activity sufficient to constitute
a nexus for purposes of service of process is not necessarily sufficient
to permit taxation of the same foreign corporation. Similarly, in
those cases in which the courts actually apply a commerce clause
analysis rather than a quantitative "doing business" approach, the
various contexts of state legislative control are distinguished. Their
discussions imply that the differing conclusions are attributable to
a commerce clause standard of varying stringency instead of recog-
nizing that a balancing of the burdens on the corporation's inter-
state business against the benefits and protection received by the
165. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
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corporation from the state and the state interest in promulgating
the legislation has simply produced a different result. As a conse-
quence, not only have the applicable constitutional standards been
confused, but the decisions of the courts in one context still have
little precedential value in another. This confusion is manifested in
cases such as Lilly, in which the majority was criticized for applying
tax and service of process cases in the qualification context,"' and
Aldens, Inc. v. Lafollette, in which the Seventh Circuit miscon-
strued both constitutional standards in attempting to define the
varying degrees under each.'17
Consistency could be restored to the constitutional analysis of
state control over foreign corporations, while retaining legitimate
distinctions among the contexts in which such control is exercised,
if the courts would eliminate the problems inherent in the "doing
business" analysis and apply a single, undifferentiated standard for
both the due process and commerce clauses in all contexts. Analysis
of the validity of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations would
thus proceed as follows. The threshold issue is whether certain mini-
mum contacts, as defined in International Shoe, exist to a sufficient
extent that control can be exercised consistent with due process. Use
of the due process standard developed in service of process cases,
and arguably applicable in cases involving regulatory legislation,
would require a substantial reduction in the nexus required to sup-
port state taxation of foreign corporations. The more rigid due pro-
cess standard, however, hardly is justified. One commentator noted
that there is "quite as much difficulty in finding warrant in the
Constitution for the present due process restrictions on State taxa-
tion as there was for the now rejected prohibition of double taxa-
tion.""' Another critic of the Court's present nexus requirement
remarked that the territorial conception of due process applied in
tax cases, "which has been rejected with respect to adjudicatory
jurisdiction, is too formulaic to allow for fair results in all cases" and
suggested that instead "some connection less than actual presence
in the jurisdiction should be sufficient.""' Although advocates of
the present nexus standard will argue that the "minimum contacts"
approach will permit harmfully extensive taxation of foreign corpo-
rations, such issues are properly dealt with in the context of the
commerce clause.' Thus judicial jurisdiction analysis need proceed
166. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
167. See notes 114-17 supra and accompanying text.
168. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 697.
169. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAnv. L. REv. 71, 82 (1977).
170. "There are adequate constitutional resources which can be utilized to cope with
1979] 1139
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
no further than a determination that the state has established a
sufficient nexus with the foreign corporation to justify assumption
of such jurisdiction.
For purposes of legislative jurisdiction, however, the statute
must withstand the commerce clause challenge. Previous adjudica-
tions of this issue in the context of tax, police power, and qualifica-
tion statutes suffered not so much from an explicit attempt to pro-
vide varying degrees of commerce clause protection as from an over-
all failure of the courts to define the standard being applied. This
failure is understandable in light of the frequent changes in the
Court's political philosophy of the basic commerce clause dilemma:
whether the state need for legislative control and revenues out-
weighs the national need for a thriving economy, unaffected by state
lines.
The Court's recent decision in Complete Auto Transit, how-
ever, demonstrates an awareness of the need for unified treatment
of interstate commerce. While state regulatory authority over purely
interstate commerce had long been recognized, the Court in
Complete Auto Transit for the first time held that a state could tax
even the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce to the extent
such commerce was conducted within the taxing state. The Court's
approach in that case provides a good foundation for developing a
single commerce clause standard for testing the validity of all state
legislation affecting foreign corporations. Under such a standard,
state legislation would be valid to the extent, first, that it is reasona-
ble in relation to the foreign corporation's local activities and to the
benefits and protections conferred by the state upon those activities
and, second, that the burden of compliance is outweighed by the
state interest in promulgating such legislation. Utilizing a single
standard should not alter the result in most cases. For example,
requiring compliance with a qualification statute may still be
deemed unconstitutional because prohibiting access to the courts of
a state or refusing to enforce a contract may be an unreasonable
burden if the corporation's local activities are rather minimal. No
longer, however, should courts reject the application of qualification
statutes to foreign corporations on the ground that the corporation
was engaged in purely interstate commerce. Not only is such a "free
trade" approach no longer consistent with the realities of a commer-
cial society in which it is difficult to find transactions that do not
have interstate aspects, but there is simply no reliable test of
the problem [of cumulative taxes], without reading into the Due Process Clause a restriction
on taxing power which the provision does not justify." HE.ERsTEmN, supra note 2, at 697.
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"purely interstate commerce." Similarly, the substantial state in-
terest in protecting its citizenry through police power regulations
may often outweigh the burdens of compliance, just as it does now.
This proposed approach not only provides clarity of analysis, but
reduces any need for differentiation among the cases-the same due
process nexus requirement and commerce clause balancing ap-
proach is applied to every case.
V. CoNcLusIoN
Through discussions of the historical judicial treatment of state
attempts to exercise control over foreign corporations, this Note
demonstrates the basis of the confusion that still exists in ascertain-
ing the limits on the exercise of such jurisdiction. Although consid-
erable strides have been made away from the problematic concept
of "doing business" that dominated early decisions, judicial analy-
sis is still permeated by the notion originating in "doing business"
cases that the same standard must define different tests for the
different types of state jurisdiction.
This Note proposes that the due process clause and commerce
clause should each define a single standard by which the validity
of the exercise of state authority should be measured. Such an anal-
ysis does not ignore the fact that some state attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign corporations are less justified than others.
The analysis, however, is based on the presumption that states
should have a right to control and receive revenues from corpora-
tions that take advantage of the resources of the state, a right that
depends upon the existence of a state-corporation relationship de-
fined by the due process clause. In those instances in which the
piosperity of foreign corporations, and thus our national economy,
is jeopardized by such state jurisdiction, the commerce clause
should provide the countervailing, protective influence. Such an
analysis assures a consistency that at present is lacking.
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